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Cognitive and psychological flexibility after a traumatic brain injury and the 
implications for treatment in acceptance-based therapies: A conceptual review 
Abstract 
This paper provides a selective review of cognitive and psychological flexibility in the 
context of treatment for psychological distress after traumatic brain injury, with a focus 
on acceptance-based therapies. Cognitive flexibility is a component of executive function 
that is referred to mostly in the context of neuropsychological research and practice. 
Psychological flexibility, from a clinical psychology perspective, is linked to health and 
wellbeing and is an identified treatment outcome for therapies such as Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy. There are a number of overlaps between the constructs. They both 
manifest in the ability to change behaviour (either a thought or an action) in response to 
environmental change, with similarities in neural substrate and mental processes. 
Impairments in both show a strong association with psychopathology. People with a TBI 
often suffer impairments in their cognitive flexibility as a result of damage to areas 
controlling executive processes but have a positive response to therapies that promote 
psychological flexibility. Overall, psychological flexibility appears a more overarching 
construct and cognitive flexibility may be a subcomponent of it but not necessarily a pre-
requisite. Further research into therapies which claim to improve psychological flexibility 
such as ACT needs to be undertaken in TBI populations in order to clarify its utility in 
this group. 
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Introduction 
Flexibility in mental processes has been extensively studied and measured from a 
neuropsychological perspective since the late 1940s (Berg, 1948). More recently, 
flexibility has become a desired treatment outcome in what has been termed acceptance-
based therapies such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Villatte, 
Levin, & Hildebrandt, 2011). There appears to be similarities in the way psychologists 
who undertake cognitive assessments and those who use acceptance-based therapies view 
the construct of mental flexibility. For example, there are definitional overlaps and both 
groups recognise that impairments in flexibility are strongly associated with 
psychopathology (e.g. Berman, Wheaton, McGrath, & Abramowitz, 2010; Bricker, 
Wyszynski, Comstock, & Heffner, 2013b).  
 Despite these similarities, mental flexibility currently appears to be viewed from two 
different perspectives within psychology and given separate labels, namely cognitive and 
psychological flexibility. However, there has been no formal consideration of the 
overlapping theoretical features between these perspectives of mental flexibility. The 
construct of cognitive flexibility (sometimes referred to as mental flexibility) has a long 
and well developed history and appears to be well understood and validated. 
Psychological flexibility has a more recent history arising out of acceptance-based 
therapies. With an exponential rise in clinical outcome research that assesses these 
therapies, there is a need to develop an improved understanding of the underlying 
construct. At the current time, it is unclear whether cognitive and psychological 
flexibility are identical, overlapping or entirely separate constructs. 
COGNITIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AFTER TBI  4 
 
  The nature of the relationship between cognitive and psychological flexibility may 
have important clinical implications for interventions that promote psychological 
flexibility to address adjustment issues after a traumatic brain injury (TBI). Impairments 
in cognitive flexibility have been well established in populations with a brain injury (e.g. 
Heled, Hoofien, Margalit, Natovich, & Agranov, 2012; McDonald, Flashman, & Saykin, 
2002; Niemeier, Marwitz, Lesher, Walker, & Bushnik, 2007). Therefore if cognitive and 
psychological flexibility are the same construct or overlapping, the applicability of these 
acceptance-based therapies after a TBI needs further exploration.  
 Over the past two decades there has been a growing confidence that psychological 
therapies can make a significant contribution to the adjustment process after a TBI 
despite the range of cognitive impairments characteristic of brain-injured populations 
(Bombardier et al., 2009; Cattelani, Zettin, & Zoccolotti, 2010). Initial work has trialled 
interventions based on cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) approaches, which rely on 
techniques such as cognitive restructuring and improved problem-solving to achieve the 
therapeutic benefit (e.g., Ashman, Cantor, Tsaousides, Spielman, & Gordon, 2014; 
Simpson, Tate, Whiting, & Cotter, 2011). Acceptance-based therapies, such as 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT: C. Kim, Johnson, Cilles, & Gold, 2011), 
have a different therapeutic target. Namely, helping patients experience difficult thoughts 
without struggling to change their content, while also persisting with values consistent 
behaviour. The fundamental proposition of ACT is that psychological flexibility is a core 
mechanism of change that directly contributes to psychological wellbeing (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010). Another key change mechanism within ACT involves helping people 
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accept difficult experiences and engage in committed behaviour, in the context of a 
values guided life.  
 There is a growing interest in the potential application of ACT in assisting clients 
navigate the complex issues influencing recovery following a TBI (Kangas & McDonald, 
2011; Soo, Tate, & Lane-Brown, 2011). For example, ACT might facilitate adaptation 
and acceptance of changed functioning and life circumstances following a severe TBI 
(Kangas & McDonald, 2011). However, before utilising ACT to treat psychological 
distress in individuals with a TBI, the relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
psychological flexibility, both conceptually and empirically, should be clarified. 
 Our fundamental question is whether impaired cognitive flexibility secondary to TBI, 
constrains the capacity to develop the psychological flexibility required to cope with the 
emotional impact of the injury. Addressing this question may improve our understanding 
of current treatments that improve function after TBI and provide additional knowledge 
of how acceptance-based therapies may be effective for this population.  
 To address this aim, the literature relating to cognitive versus psychological flexibility 
derived from several lines of inquiry will be reviewed. Specifically, we review research 
identifying the constituent mental processes of flexibility; evidence relating to the neural 
substrate of flexibility; the clinical implications of inflexibility for psychopathology; 
methods for assessing flexibility; and treatment approaches aimed at increasing 
flexibility. The focus of the review is on those with severe TBI (Russell & Smith, 1961) 
as they are more like to demonstrate larger and more persistent cognitive impairments 
than both mild head injury (Schretlen & Shapiro, 2003) and moderate TBI (Guise, 2010). 
Furthermore, in severe TBI, impairments can persist for many years after the injury and 
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cause ongoing psychological distress (Jennifer M. Fleming & Ownsworth, 2006). 
Interventions resulting in improved psychological flexibility with a severe TBI 
population are likely to be generalisable to individuals with less severe injuries but not 
necessarily vice a versa. However, the literature on severe TBI is limited, therefore 
evidence for the review will be drawn from studies of broader acquired brain injury 
(ABI), non-brain damaged clinical groups, as well as healthy adults.  
 An overall summary of the commonalities and differences will then be provided, as 
well as findings from the two studies that have sought to investigate the links between 
cognitive and psychological flexibility. Finally, implications of the findings from the 
review for the psychological treatment in people with severe TBI will be discussed with a 
focus on those acceptance-based therapies or interventions that aim to improve 
psychological flexibility (e.g., ACT, mindfulness).  
 
Acceptance-based Therapies 
Before commencing the review, a brief outline of acceptance-based therapies is needed. 
The third wave of behavioural therapies has been referred to as acceptance-based 
cognitive behavioural therapies (Forman & Herbert, 2009) and includes ACT, as well as 
mindfulness based therapies (e.g., Kabat‐Zinn, 2003). Creating or improving 
psychological flexibility is the main focus of these acceptance-based therapies and they 
are proposed to be qualitatively different from CBT. Rather than focussing on symptom 
reduction, they aim to allow individuals to accept difficult internal and external 
experiences while remaining present in their life and not engaging in an avoidant coping 
style. Remaining “present” in this context refers to being open and willing to experience 
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these (difficult) thoughts and feelings, which in the domain of acceptance-based therapies 
is referred to as being more psychologically flexible. Being psychologically flexible in 
ACT also includes behavioural activation where despite, or in the presence of these 
difficult experiences, the individual is encouraged to engage in activity that is consistent 
with their identified values.  
 The model underpinning ACT proposes there are six core processes involved in 
achieving psychological flexibility and these are grouped under two broader categories of 
either mindfulness or behaviourally based processes. The six core processes are listed and 
defined in Table 1 and diagrammatically represented by a hexaflex (Hayes, Luoma, 
Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006) (Figure 1). A number of therapeutic techniques, including 
roles plays and metaphors, are used to help target and develop these core processes as the 
clinician works in a non-linear manner through the hexaflex. 
(insert Figure 1 about here) 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
 Experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion can arise when these processes are not 
implemented and results in psychological inflexibility. Experiential avoidance, as 
opposed to acceptance, occurs when a person actively attempts to change experiences, 
both internal and external, that gives rise to difficult thoughts and emotions. Cognitive 
fusion is the process which perpetuates experiential avoidance by causing a person to 
become caught in the content of thoughts rather the context in which they occur.  
 All six core processes in the hexaflex (or psychological flexibility model) contribute to 
the development of psychological flexibility but it is not clear what the relative 
contribution of each process is and how this may differ with each individual.  
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Research indicates that ACT promotes psychological flexibility in a range of contexts and 
psychological/health conditions (Ruiz, 2010) but the construct appears to be transitioning 
from the ACT framework and being used more broadly in psychology. A challenge in the 
interpretation of this research is that aspects of the conceptualisation of the psychological 
flexibility construct appears to be still evolving and requires further clarification 
(Wolgast, 2014).  
 
Current Conceptualisations of Cognitive and Psychological Flexibility 
Mental processes involved in cognitive flexibility 
 In the neuropsychological literature, cognitive flexibility has been defined as the 
ability to change behaviour such as thoughts or actions in response to situational demands 
(Cañas, Antoli, Fajardo, & Salmerón, 2005; Lezak, 2004). It is a component of executive 
functioning, the group of higher order cognitive abilities that include planning, problem 
solving, goal development and achievement (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Burgess & 
Alderman, 2004; Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000; Strauss, Sherman, & 
Spreen, 2006). These abilities are considered to be essential for purposeful human 
behaviour (Lezak, 2004) and can entail spontaneous and reactive components (Eslinger & 
Grattan, 1993). The processes underpinning cognitive flexibility are dynamic, involving 
cycles of thought generation and suppression that emerge and dissipate as the individual 
interacts with changing environmental factors such as contextual cues and task demands 
(Ionescu, 2012). This model proposed by Ionescu (2012) has been described as a ‘unified 
framework of cognitive flexibility’, involving a number of cognitive components or 
mechanisms. These include various executive functions, attention, perception, goal 
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parameters and monitoring in conjunction with task demands, contextual cues and 
sensorimotor input. Hence, the concept of cognitive flexibility encompasses more than 
simple response switching.  
Neural substrate of cognitive flexibility  
 Damage to the frontal lobes of the brain has traditionally been associated with 
impairments in the executive functions which are closely linked to the concept of 
flexibility (Ownsworth, Clare, & Morris, 2006). Though fractionation of the frontal lobe 
is observed for specific tasks there appears to be a more general distribution of activation 
across several regions for executive functions (Stuss, 2011). In specific studies, the 
activation of neural networks has been mapped in samples of healthy adults undertaking 
tasks involving cognitive flexibility. Reviews have indicated both frontal and non-frontal 
regions of the brain are activated by tests assessing executive functions (Vowles & 
McCracken, 2010). As a specific example of the neurological substrates of cognitive 
flexibility in healthy adults, a switching task such as the Trail Making Test Part B, evokes 
distinct left sided activation of the dorsolateral and medial frontal regions of the brain as 
well as activity in the left middle and superior temporal gyrus (Johansson, Bjuhr, & 
Rönnbäck, 2012). This is consistent with the operation of a central executive network 
within the brain that subserves this range of behaviours (Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 
2008) but it is apparent that some fractionation of executive functions on a 
neuroanatomical basis is possible. For example, while both the frontal lobes and basal 
ganglia have been implicated in tasks involving response-shifting, the basal ganglia is 
less implicated in broader cognitive flexibility involving divergent thought and fluency 
(Eslinger & Grattan, 1993).  
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 Expanding the construct to include highly abstract cognitive switching was found to 
recruit the anterior pre-frontal cortex (Jennifer M Fleming, Winnington, McGillivray, 
Tatarevic, & Ownsworth, 2006). Adding language to cognitive flexibility task, including 
tasks such as category switching and verbal fluency, implicates an extensive distributed 
network of brain regions. This  includes the frontal, temporal and parietal regions in the 
left hemisphere and indicates shared neural substrates with working memory, processing 
speed and language processing (Bédard et al., 2014). It would appear that even an activity 
perceived as relatively simple, such as shifting set, activates a larger network than the 
frontal lobes and the complexity of the network of activation increases when the task 
involves a language component.  
Mental health implications of impairments in cognitive flexibility 
 Impairments in cognitive flexibility, as measured by a range of neuropsychological 
tests, have been identified in a number of psychological disorders and are common after a 
TBI. For example, people diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Martinez-
Aran et al., 2001), generalised anxiety disorder (Fledderus, Bohlmeijer, Fox, Schreurs, & 
Spinhoven, 2013), eating disorders (Kabat‐Zinn, 2003; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & 
Hayes, 2012; Steinglass, Walsh, & Stern, 2006), posttraumatic stress disorder (Shields & 
Ownsworth, 2013) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Forman & Herbert, 2009), all 
show some disruption of flexibility. This provides strong evidence for the suggestion that 
inflexibility is a key factor in psychopathology (Johnco, Wuthrich, & Rapee, 2014). In 
both eating disorders (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006) and major depressive 
disorder (Deveney & Deldin, 2006), it has been shown that poor cognitive flexibility is 
associated with poor response to treatment. Furthermore, in a small sample of females 
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with PTSD (n=15), improvements in cognitive flexibility accompanied a decrease in 
PTSD symptoms after trauma-focussed psychological treatment (Shields & Ownsworth, 
2013). 
 The question of how cognitive inflexibility contributes to the maintenance of 
symptoms in major depressive disorder was explored by Deveny and Deldin (2010). 
They found that when individuals with major depressive disorder were exposed to 
negative stimuli in the form of negative words (e.g. “agony”); they made more 
perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST), indicative of greater 
inflexibility. The controls made more perseverative errors when they were exposed to 
positive words (e.g. “admired”). This link between perseverative inflexibility, or 
becoming stuck on an idea, and psychopathology is also evident in individuals with a 
tendency to ruminate when dysphoric. Supporting the link between rumination and 
cognitive flexibility is Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (2000) research showing that 
ruminators displayed more perseverative errors and had more difficulty in maintaining set 
on the WCST than did non-ruminators.  
 In TBI, impairments in cognitive flexibility and executive function including problem 
solving, planning and abstract thinking are common (Heled et al., 2012). Clinically these 
impairments are often a source of treatment difficulties and results in functional 
difficulties for many years after the injury (McDonald, et al., 2002). Impairments in 
cognitive flexibility have also shown an association with both the understanding of 
emotions (i.e., empathy) and expression of emotions in ABI samples (Grattan & Eslinger, 
1989; Shamary-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003). 
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The same problems are associated with the presence of psychopathology in the TBI 
populations. TBI patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder were found to have 
greater impairments in cognitive flexibility, as measured by neuropsychological tests 
(WCST and TMT), than those without a diagnosis of depression (Jorge et al., 2004). 
Impaired executive function, which included neuropsychological measures of cognitive 
flexibility (TMT and Verbal Fluency), has also found to be greater in individuals with a 
TBI and comorbid anxiety disorder (Gould, Ponsford, & Spitz, 2014). Even though 
individuals with a TBI often have impaired cognitive flexibility, this inflexibility appears 
to be even higher if they are suffering from significant levels of psychological distress.  
 Another clinical implication for impairments in cognitive flexibility after a TBI is the 
impact of impaired self-awareness. Impaired self-awareness has a complex, multifaceted 
relationship with the recovery process after TBI involving neurocognitive, psychological 
and socio-environmental factors (Hoofien, Gilboa, Vakil, & Donovick, 2001; Makvand 
Hoseini, Rezaei, & Azadi, 2014a; Ownsworth et al., 2007; Ownsworth & McFarland, 
2004). A positive relationship has been established between impaired cognitive flexibility 
and impaired self-awareness using a range of self-awareness measures and 
neuropsychological tests of cognitive flexibility  (Chard, Schumm, McIlvain, Bailey, & 
Parkinson, 2011; Farb et al., 2007; Guise, 2010; Masuda, Price, Anderson, & Wendell, 
2010). This association between cognitive flexibility and self-awareness appears 
noteworthy and will be discussed further in the section titled, ‘Implications for 
Psychological Treatment after TBI’.  
 From research with both clinical and TBI groups it appears the relationship between 
impairments in cognitive flexibility and psychopathology is multifaceted. Impaired 
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cognitive flexibility is a perpetuating factor by contributing to symptom maintenance and 
also appears to be a barrier for treatment in terms of impaired self-awareness. Moreover, 
the presence of psychopathology and cognitive inflexibility appears to contribute to 
broader cognitive decline. Data about causality or directionality of the cognitive 
flexibility-psychopathology relationship is not currently available to help guide clinical 
interventions. There still needs to be further research to explore whether psychopathology 
is an antecedent to, concomitant with or a consequence of cognitive inflexibility or 
whether all operate synergistically. 
Measuring cognitive flexibility 
 Measures of cognitive flexibility are divided into task-based objective tests, which 
require the participant to demonstrate a certain behavioural response, and self-report 
measures. The most recognised task-based test of cognitive flexibility is the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1981). The 
cognitive processes underlying the WCST are considered to involve the ability to 
maintain a response, problem solving, cognitive flexibility (Greve et al., 2002) and 
working memory (Hartman, Steketee, Silva, Lanning, & Andersson, 2003). High 
numbers of perseverative errors, where the respondent fails to make changes in their 
behaviour in response to feedback, is indicative of cognitive inflexibility or simply the 
inability to “shift”, although as previously mentioned cognitive flexibility is recognised as 
more than just set shifting.  
 The Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1978) is 
proposed to measure spontaneous cognitive flexibility (i.e., a generative ability), 
providing additional information to the WCST (Bush, Novack, & Schneider, 1999). The 
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test requires participants to generate up to six alternate uses for common objects such as a 
car tyre. In addition to these tests, components of measures assessing the broader 
construct of executive function also appear to assess cognitive flexibility. These include 
the Trail Making Test Part B (Kortte, Horner, & Windham, 2002; Reitan, 1958), the 
Stroop Test (Strauss et al., 2006) and measures of verbal fluency (Borkowski, Benton, & 
Spreen, 1967) among others. Ionescu (2012), provides a comprehensive review of task-
based measures of cognitive flexibility for both adults and children.  
 In addition to these neuropsychological measures of cognitive flexibility, there have 
been self-report measures developed which are described as assessing cognitive 
flexibility. Their development has arisen from the requirement to quantify cognitive 
therapy efficacy and appear to have a very different focus than the traditional objective 
task-based cognitive measures already described. Recent cross validation between 
neuropsychological measures of cognitive flexibility and self-report measures have 
indicated predominantly weak relationships between them (Johnco et al., 2014), 
suggesting that they are not measuring the same construct or cognitive process. 
 Despite the weak association with task-based measures of cognitive flexibility, they 
may provide a link to the construct of psychological flexibility as they have been 
developed from a clinical psychology perspective. These self-report measures include the 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI: Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010) and the Cognitive 
Flexibility Scales (CFS: Bilgin, 2009; Martin & Rubin, 1995). The CFI has been 
developed to measure the flexibility required to adequately challenge unhelpful thought 
processes as promoted in CBT and has a problem solving orientation. The CFS for adults 
encompasses behavioural concepts including “an awareness of options and alternatives, a 
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willingness to be flexible and adapt to the situation and self-efficacy in being flexible” 
(Martin & Rubin, 1995 p. 623). The CFS for adolescents (Bilgin, 2009) purports to 
measure the flexibility of adolescents with regard to themselves, others and their 
environment by having respondents rate opposite adjective pairs (e.g., cowardly/brave; 
bad/good) on a five point Likert scale.  
 The goal of these self-report measures encompasses a broader spectrum of cognitive 
flexibility than neuropsychological task-based measures which are reductionist, assessing 
quite focussed tasks. If both these types of measures are assessing cognitive flexibility, it 
suggests that the construct is broader than what is implied by the use of traditional task-
based cognitive tests alone.  
Treating impairments in cognitive flexibility 
 Treatments targeting impairments in cognitive flexibility are subsumed by the broader 
treatment of executive dysfunction and both cognitive remediation and pharmacological 
interventions have yielded improvements in executive function after a TBI (McDonald, et 
al., 2002). The efficacy of pharmacological interventions are mixed and medications do 
not target specific cognitive deficits (Schillerstrom, 2009). Although initial findings from 
cognitive remediation are positive, it is a costly, intensive intervention requires a high 
number of treatment sessions (e.g., 40) in order to ensure skill development and 
behavioural change. Also, skill development from cognitive remediation training has 
shown limited generalisability to functional real-world settings (Cicerone et al., 2000).   
 Looking at studies which included a more heterogeneous sample, improvements in 
cognitive flexibility were demonstrated in an ABI sample which included a proportion of 
participants with TBI (n=33/75) (Tagliaferri, Compagnone, Korsic, Servadei, & Kraus, 
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2006). The study investigated various executive functions of which flexibility was one 
component. Two groups received different types of cognitive training (20-24 one hour 
sessions). Both groups demonstrated similar improvements in flexibility over time as 
measured by the Stroop Test but there were no significant differences found between the 
two groups. 
 Shorter treatment programs (five sessions) though have also been found to be effective 
in improving executive function after a TBI using a task shifting exercise (Stablum, 
Umiltà, Mazzoldi, Pastore, & Magon, 2007). A review of treatments to address 
impairments in cognitive flexibility in other clinical populations (schizophrenia, 
pathological gambling, anorexia nervosa) indicates that both pharmacological 
interventions (Grant, Chamberlain, Odlaug, Potenza, & Kim, 2010; Pardo et al., 2011) 
and cognitive remediation (Delahunty, Morice, & Frost, 1993; Tchanturia, Davies, & 
Campbell, 2007; Wykes et al., 2007) can be effective.  
 In summary, there is evidence that cognitive remediation maybe effective for 
impairments in executive functions (Cicerone et al., 2011). Treatments that specifically 
target impairments in cognitive flexibility after a TBI need development (Chung, Pollock, 
Campbell, Durward, & Hagen, 2013) and how this links with psychopathology also 
merits further investigation. 
Mental processes involved in psychological flexibility  
 Psychological flexibility is defined as the ability to connect with the present moment 
and experience the thoughts and feelings without unhelpful defense, and to persist in 
action that is consistent with values, or change that action when the situation demands (C. 
Kim et al., 2011). This conceptualisation incorporates the behavioural component of 
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committed action, which makes psychological flexibility more comprehensive than just 
acceptance (Bond et al., 2011). It also appears to be independent of other constructs of 
psychological distress, such as anxiety and depression, as defined by symptom based self-
report measures (Gloster, Klotsche, Chaker, Hummel, & Hoyer, 2011). This definition 
has two components, acceptance and a behavioural component of committed action. The 
latter component seems to be consistent with how cognitive flexibility is defined 
suggesting at a definitional level, cognitive flexibility is a component of psychological 
flexibility. 
 Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010), provide a broad conceptualisation of psychological 
flexibility where they delineate three core components. The first component is executive 
functioning such as the ability to rapidly shift cognitive set and thereby attention, 
indicating overlap with the construct of cognitive flexibility. The other two components 
relate to the individual’s ability to achieve a balanced or default state (namely a type of 
psychological equilibrium) and underlying personality traits such as neuroticism, positive 
affect, openness to experience and self-control.  
 Despite psychological flexibility being represented as a multicomponent construct 
(Figure 1), results from factor analysis of instruments such as the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011), designed to assess the six core processes 
targeted in ACT, are best explained by a one-factor solution. This outcome supports the 
premise of a unidimensional, overarching construct of psychological flexibility (Bond et 
al., 2011). The specific mental processes involved in psychological flexibility are not 
fully understood but are proposed to involve attention and short term memory (Kashdan 
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& Rottenberg, 2010). The behavioural component of psychological flexibility involves 
goal setting and planning reflecting higher order executive mental processes.  
 The ACT model of psychological flexibility implicates a number of distinct mental 
processes. The mindfulness component used in ACT engages processes on the left side of 
the hexaflex (see Figure 1) such as defusion and contact with the present moment. 
Mindfulness has been extensively studied in recent years, as the benefits of mindfulness-
based psychological treatments have been scrutinised. Mindfulness can be described as a 
psychological state where an individual regulates their attention to present-moment 
awareness and adopts a non-judgemental orientation towards those experiences (Bishop 
et al., 2004). The mental processes underlying mindfulness are proposed to include both 
focussed and selective attention (Luciano et al., 2014). The heart of mindfulness is the 
open awareness and acceptance of ongoing experience in a non-judgemental way 
(Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008; Roozenbeek, Maas, & Menon, 
2013).  
Neural substrate of psychological flexibility   
 Generally, the neural substrate of psychological flexibility has received limited 
research attention. However, some studies have assessed the practice of mindfulness. 
Engagement in mindfulness meditation has been shown to decrease activity in the right 
medial prefrontal cortex (Langer & Padrone, 1992) while activation occurs in the dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Chiesa & Serretti, 2010; 
Hölzel et al., 2007; Vago & Silbersweig, 2012). Using different meditative tasks 
(narrative or experiential), activated different and very complex neural networks (Farb et 
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al 2007) making it difficult to make generalisations about the neural substrate involved in 
meditative tasks.  
 Other components of psychological flexibility that have received some neuroimaging 
research attention is experiential avoidance, which is the mirror opposite of psychological 
flexibility. This may provide additional insights into the potential neural basis of 
psychological flexibility. For example individuals rated high in neuroticism who engaged 
in higher levels of harm avoidance, displayed greater activation of the right anterior 
insula when exposed to risk taking decisions than those lower in neuroticism (Levin et 
al., 2012). Avoidance of aversive stimuli (losing money) has been found to activate the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (H. Kim, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2006).  
 The identification of a specific neural mechanism associated with psychological 
flexibility is complex but it appears to suggest overlap with those associated with 
cognitive flexibility (e.g., the prefrontal cortex). However, as there are limited studies, 
which have addressed only components of psychological flexibility, it is difficult to draw 
strong conclusions about the association with cognitive flexibility. The contextual 
approach proposed by ACT, where the individual is viewed within their own 
environment, suggests a dynamic process which would indicate a wider neural network 
that is currently reported in the literature. Further research into this area is warranted in 
order to provide greater clarity of the neural substrate of psychological flexibility.  
Mental health implications for impairments in psychological flexibility 
Impairments in psychological flexibility have been associated with psychopathology 
and measures of psychological flexibility are related to a number of self-report measures 
of psychological distress (Bond et al., 2011). This inverse relationship between self-
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reported distress and psychological flexibility has also been established in individuals 
with an ABI (Whiting, Deane, Ciarrochi, McLeod, & Simpson, 2015). Acceptance-based 
therapies such as ACT have a theoretical foundation in Relational Frame Theory (RFT). 
Broadly, RFT posits that language and higher cognition is based on the relationships 
humans build between objects (Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2002; 
C. Kim et al., 2011). Rigidity or automaticity (a lack of flexibility) in these relationships 
can lead to psychopathology (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McHugh, & Hayes, 
2004).  
The link between impairments in psychological flexibility and psychopathology has 
been demonstrated across a number of disorders (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010). These have included depression (Bohlmeijer, Fledderus, Rokx, & 
Pieterse, 2011), eating disorders (Chiesa & Serretti, 2010; Merwin et al., 2010) and 
anxiety (Arch, Eifert, et al., 2012). This reflects similar relationships that have been 
established between psychopathology and impairments in cognitive flexibility providing 
further evidence of overlap between the constructs.    
Measuring psychological flexibility 
 The measurement of psychological flexibility is undertaken by self-report measures. It 
has been suggested this needs to be extended to include observation and implicit 
measurement, where the participants are not aware of the outcome of the measure, in 
order to give a more thorough assessment of psychological flexibility (Gloster et al., 
2011). Furthermore it is recommended that measures need to cover emotional, cognitive 
and behavioural in order to fully capture psychological flexibility across all domains 
(Ben-Itzhak, Bluvstein, & Maor, 2014). 
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 One of the main outcome measures in treatment trials of ACT is the AAQ-II (Bond et 
al., 2011) which claims to assess psychological flexibility/inflexibility, though indirectly, 
by measuring processes associated with psychological flexibility (Ciarrochi, Bilich, & 
Godsell, 2010). Recently, confirmatory factor analysis of the AAQ-II identified 
psychological flexibility as a unitary construct that is distinct from other psychological 
constructs such as depression and anxiety. It also explained additional variance in 
impairment and functionality in a clinical population (Gloster et al., 2011). However, at 
least one study has raised questions about the ability of the AAQ-II to discriminate 
between psychological flexibility and measures of psychological wellbeing (Wolgast, 
2014). It was found that the AAQ-II items were more strongly related to other items of 
distress than items that measured acceptance. Wolgast (2014) suggested this is a problem 
in how psychological flexibility has been operationalised as it may be a dynamic 
psychological process that is not easily captured by static, self-report measures. Such 
views also support the contextual nature of psychological flexibility.  
 The Avoidance and Fusion Questionnaire (AFQ; Schmalz & Murrell, 2010) is a 
measure of experiential avoidance which is a major component of psychological 
inflexibility. The AFQ has been validated in both child and adolescent populations 
(Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008) as well as an adult college sample (Schmalz & Murrell, 
2010). In the college sample, the AFQ was moderately negatively correlated with the 
AAQ-II suggesting they are related but also capture slightly different constructs. The 
AFQ is thought to be more representative of cognitive fusion and avoidant behaviours 
while the AAQ-II is considered to be a more general measure of acceptance/avoidance. 
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As such the AFQ has been recommended for use in conjunction with the AAQ-II as an 
outcome measure in ACT treatment trials (Schmalz & Murrell, 2010).  
Often in ACT research, the measurement of psychological flexibility involves 
adapting existing questionnaires (e.g. AAQ-II) so that the content is specific to targeted 
disorders and populations. This enables measurement of the acceptance an individual is 
experiencing specific to the particular condition or context. In addition to the generic 
AAQ-II, there are now measures of psychological flexibility for health conditions such as 
diabetes (Gregg, Callaghan, Hayes, & Glenn-Lawson, 2007) and pain (McCracken, 
Vowles, & Eccleston, 2004).  
A measure for people with an ABI has recently been validated (Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire for Acquired Brain Injury, AAQ-ABI; (Whiting et al., 2015). The 
nine item AAQ-ABI poses questions specifically targeted to address acceptance and 
experiential avoidance associated with reactions about having an ABI. The goal is to 
assess avoidance and acceptance of thoughts, feelings and behaviours that may arise as a 
result of incurring a brain injury (e.g., “I stop doing things when I feel scared about my 
brain injury”). The measure has been developed for people with cognitive impairments 
and features the use of simplified language and a shorter 5-point Likert scale (as opposed 
to a 7-point Likert scale on the AAQ-II). 
Treating impairments in psychological flexibility 
As discussed there is some research into cognitive flexibility after TBI but few studies 
about psychological flexibility which is still in its preliminary stages (Sylvester, 2011; 
Whiting, Simpson, Ciarrochi, & McLeod, 2012; Whiting, Simpson, McLeod, Deane, & 
Ciarrochi, 2012). ACT treatment trials have a focus on either reducing or increasing a 
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behaviour or emotion within a specific context and such changes are thought to be 
indicative of psychological flexibility (Levin et al., 2012). For example, a reduction in 
smoking behaviour (Bricker, Wyszynski, Comstock, & Heffner, 2013a).  
 The limited research in brain injury, includes an ACT intervention that was 
successfully implemented to increase participation and adaptive functioning in 
adolescents and adults (ages 15-59 years) who had acquired their brain injury before the 
age of 18 years (82% TBI) (Sylvester, 2011). Although the study found improvements in 
psychological flexibility, the self-report measure to assess this outcome had not been 
validated. In another study, improvements in psychological flexibility (as measured using 
the AAQ-ABI) were achieved using an ACT intervention with two men with a severe 
TBI (Whiting, Simpson, Ciarrochi, et al., 2012). Both participants, who displayed 
impairments in cognitive flexibility (Trail Making Test), showed improvements in their 
psychological flexibility and one participant exhibited significant decreases in 
psychological distress, while the second reported an increased participation in valued life 
activities.  
Broadening the focus to investigate mindfulness-based therapies after TBI reveals 
mixed findings. Specifically the treatments used with TBI have included mindfulness 
based stress reduction (MBSR) to improve quality of life (Fossati et al., 2003) and to 
address mental fatigue (Johansson et al., 2012), though the latter sample included people 
who had experienced a stroke (55% of the sample). Mindfulness treatment was found to 
be ineffective in improving cognitive impairments, specifically improving attentional 
problems in a TBI population (McMillan, Robertson, Brock, & Chorlton, 2002). The 
treatment also had no impact on self-reported anxiety or depression levels but it should be 
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noted that all pre-treatment scores across the groups were at or below the cut off for 
caseness.  
 A recent randomised controlled trial implemented mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (MBCT) to treat depression after a TBI (Bédard et al., 2014). Significant 
reductions in self-reported depression and improvements in levels of acceptance as 
measured on the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto et al., 2008) were found. 
The generalisability of this research to the TBI population is confounded by the limited 
description of the participants with regard their TBI. No measure of cognitive function or 
severity of the TBI, (e.g., PTA or GCS, Glasgow Coma Score), was reported making it 
unclear whether this therapy mode might be suitable for those suffering severe to 
extremely severe cognitive impairments. 
 Due to the limited research in treating impairments in psychological flexibility after a 
TBI, it is worth drawing on research in other populations in order to clarify its potential 
benefits with a TBI population. Empirical outcome research using ACT, which promotes 
psychological flexibility as a treatment outcome, in health/clinical psychology has been 
growing exponentially. The research has yielded positive results with effect sizes ranging 
from .20 to 2.91 at follow up (see Ruiz, 2010 for a recent review). Though the early 
studies comparing ACT and CBT tended to lack experimental rigour (Forman et al., 
2012), a meta-analysis comparing ACT with CBT found that ACT performed better than 
CBT on outcome measures in 69% (11 out of 16) of the studies in the review (Ruiz, 
2012). Other studies have indicated that ACT produced similar outcomes to CBT in 
anxiety disorders though the mechanisms of change maybe different (Arch, Eifert, et al., 
2012).  
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 ACT has been used successfully with a range of different populations including 
psychotic patients (Bach & Hayes, 2002) and chronic pain clients (Dahl, Wilson, & 
Nilsson, 2004). It has also proved to be efficacious for people presenting with anxiety and 
depression (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, & Geller, 2007) and with chronic health 
problems such as diabetes (Gregg et al., 2007) and tinnitus (Westin, Hayes, & Andersson, 
2008). The effectiveness of ACT with chronic health conditions suggests it may be 
suitable for dealing with the complex adjustment process post TBI as types of chronic 
health conditions studies also require acceptance of persistent and uncontrollable 
symptoms similar to what is required after a TBI. 
 
Commonalities and Differences between Cognitive and Psychological Flexibility 
The review suggests that overall, psychological flexibility is not wholly dependent upon 
cognitive flexibility (see Table 2 for a summary). The process of refining the construct of 
psychological flexibility though, is still a work in progress and the conceptualisation may 
tighten over time. Cognitive flexibility has a much larger and well-established evidence 
base than psychological flexibility which as a construct has mainly been derived from the 
ACT movement. Although, Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) suggest that psychological 
flexibility has existed for over fifty decades but possibly know by different names such as 
ego-resiliency and self-regulation. On an definitional level, psychological flexibility 
appears to be more abstract but on investigation, cognitive flexibility for functional 
measurement purposes has been reduced to shift setting but tends to mirror the more 
abstract definition of psychological flexibility (Ionescu, 2012).  
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 The current literature suggests there were both commonalities and differences in the 
conceptualisation of the two constructs. Central to both is the notion of behavioural 
change (whether an action or a thought) in response to environmental changes. A notable 
conceptual difference between the two constructs appears to be around the components of 
acceptance and the self-as-context. Cognitive flexibility involves adapting to changing 
environmental cues, while psychological flexibility encompasses more. Individuals are 
also able to see themselves as separate from their experiences and emotions and when it 
is optimal, are able to sit and accept these experiences rather than engaging in 
behavioural change or experiential avoidance.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 There is also overlap in the constituent mental processes (e.g., attention), however 
initial research indicates that psychological flexibility appears to involve a broader range 
of mental processes. Thirdly, more research has investigated the neural substrate of 
cognitive flexibility, with key areas of the frontal lobes and the complex connections 
involved activating a wider network with increased complexity of the task. Initial work 
done in the areas of psychological flexibility suggests that various processes are 
distributed quite widely over the brain, activating additional areas to those identified in 
cognitive flexibility. This may mean that acceptance-based therapies such as ACT are 
lower in cognitive demand as they rely less heavily on cognitive functions commonly 
affected by the brain injury such as shifting response set and adapting to feedback (Heled 
et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2002; Niemeier et al., 2007).  
 In terms of assessment, investigations into cognitive flexibility have rested on 
objective measures, although questions about the ecological validity of such measures in 
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their prediction of functioning outside the testing environment have been raised (Burgess 
et al., 2006). Operationalising cognitive flexibility from these task-related measures that 
have used a reductionist approach, fails to take into account the broader context in which 
the behaviour occurs. The self-report measures of cognitive flexibility are confined to 
specific applications in the area of cognitive therapy and have limited overlap with 
objective measures of cognitive flexibility (Johnco et al., 2014). Psychological flexibility 
self-report measures are contextually based but are often focussed on flexibility around a 
specific issue or disorder and no objective ways to measure psychological flexibility have 
been developed to date. 
 Other commonalities between the two constructs arises from the mental health 
implications of impairment in either domain. There is a strong association between 
psychopathology and impairments in either domain which has been well documented 
across a range of disorders. Interventions which address impairments in these areas 
indicate some differences. Cognitive remediation and pharmacological interventions have 
been found to be effective in treating impairments in cognitive flexibility while 
psychological flexibility is increased through psychotherapy interventions, specifically 
acceptance-base therapies. There is no research into how psychopathology and 
impairments in both domains interact or, whether ACT interventions to treat 
psychopathology result in increased cognitive flexibility. Both areas are in need of further 
investigation. 
 Finally, there are a small number of studies that have explored the association between 
the two constructs. One study found cognitive inflexibility (measured by self-report) was 
positively related to experiential avoidance (measured by the Acceptance and Action 
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Questionnaire) in a sample of young women suffering from interpersonal victimisation 
(Palm & Follette, 2011). Experiential avoidance fully mediated the relationship between 
cognitive flexibility and measures of psychological distress. The authors suggested that 
an inability to think flexibly resulted in higher levels of psychological distress through 
increased experiential avoidance. Though this study found an association between the 
two constructs, the measure of cognitive flexibility utilised was the Cognitive Flexibility 
Scale (CFS: Martin & Rubin, 1995). The CFS assesses a person’s awareness of thoughts 
and behaviours for a given situation and the willingness to consider alternatives. A recent 
validation of the CFS found weak or no relationship with neuropsychological measures of 
cognitive flexibility (Johnco et al., 2014). This raises questions about whether the task-
related or the self-report measures of cognitive flexibility are adequately capturing 
cognitive flexibility.  
 Other research providing some tenuous links between cognitive and psychological 
flexibility involves implementing mindfulness to improve cognitive ability. When studied 
in healthy populations, mindfulness has been associated with improved executive control 
(Teper & Inzlicht, 2013) and increased cognitive flexibility, as measured by Stroop tasks 
(Moore & Malinowski, 2009). Specifically, individuals who engaged in meditation made 
fewer errors on the Stroop and path analysis showed that this effect was mediated by 
increased emotional acceptance (Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). Though attention has been 
found to improve after undertaking short term mindfulness training, other components of 
executive control such as cognitive flexibility (as measured by task-based tests) did not 
significantly improve (Semple, 2010). In a systematic review encompassing 23 studies,  it 
was concluded there is some support that the regular practice of mindfulness enhances 
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cognitive function but specific domains such as cognitive flexibility were not described 
(Chiesa, Calati, & Serretti, 2011). 
 The link between mindfulness, psychopathology and cognitive flexibility has recently 
been reported (Fledderus et al., 2013). Partial improvements in cognitive flexibility (as 
assessed by the Stroop test) were found after practicing mindfulness or focussed 
relaxation with individuals diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). In 
addition state anxiety also decreased after the intervention (in both mindfulness and 
relaxation groups) and this was significantly different to those individuals with GAD who 
engaged in a thought wandering task. 
 Although direct comparisons of cognitive and psychological flexibility are rare, 
available studies suggest associations between component processes of psychological 
flexibility with aspects of cognitive flexibility. There is still a need to further quantify this 
relationship in healthy, clinical and TBI populations. The implications of impairments in 
cognitive and psychological flexibility in implementing acceptance-based therapies with 
individuals with a TBI will now be explored and discussed.  
 
Implications for treatment after TBI 
Impaired cognitive and psychological flexibility after a TBI often results in the use of 
ineffective coping strategies to manage the post injury changes (Krpan, Levine, Stuss, & 
Dawson, 2007). Impaired flexibility can contribute to behavioural problems, emotional 
difficulties and provide challenges in returning to pre injury functioning (Dilley & Avent, 
2011). The impact of psychological distress after a TBI in conjunction with cognitive 
impairments can create challenges for recovery. It has been proposed that people need to 
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redefine themselves after their TBI by incorporating both their cognitive and physical 
limitations (Whitehouse, 1994).  
 Treatments to address psychological distress after a TBI have included CBT and 
though reviews have shown mixed results overall CBT is considered efficacious 
(Cattelani et al., 2010; Fann, Hart, & Schomer, 2009; Wolgast, 2014). There has been 
recent evidence that CBT can successfully be modified to account for the cognitive 
impairments after a severe TBI (Simpson et al., 2011). One criticism of CBT for 
individuals with cognitive impairment is the requirement to engage in cognitive 
restructuring that involves challenging unhelpful thought processes (Kinney, 2001). This 
process requires the individual to simultaneously hold the thought in their head, seek 
alternative thoughts and reason and rationalise in order to generate a more appropriate 
response. These strategies are particularly difficult to implement for those with cognitive 
impairments (Anson & Ponsford, 2006). This process also involves cognitive defusion, 
an important mediator of change identified for both CBT and ACT albeit in a non TBI 
populations (Arch, Wolitzky-Taylor, Eifert, & Craske, 2012; Forman et al., 2012). 
Cognitive defusion is a way of allowing the individual to focus on their thinking 
processes rather than the content or meaning of a thought often resulting in reduced 
feelings of distress. The mechanisms by which CBT and ACT implement cognitive 
defusion are theorised to be different and these differences particularly from an ACT 
perspective offer opportunities for individuals to be able to compensate for cognitive 
impairments (Coetzer, 2013). 
 In ACT the approach to cognitive defusion removes the need for intellectualising and 
reasoning. It allows the person to create distance from their thoughts without engaging in 
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them and the processes used can be quite concrete. Examples exercises include the 
repetition of a word over and over again (e.g. Milk, milk, milk exercise) or saying the 
word aloud using a silly voice. These exercises demonstrate how the impact and 
perceptions of particular language can be changed helping people recognise the 
possibility of modifying the emotional valence of language.  
 Individuals with a severe TBI are likely to be quite concrete in their thinking and have 
difficulty understanding abstract concepts (Schretlen & Shapiro, 2003). Other strategies 
involve creating a physical or concrete presence for the thought, “physicalising the 
thought”, where the person is asked to give the thought physical attributes such as shape, 
colour and texture. The use of metaphors also allows the therapist to move the abstract to 
the concrete in order to create defusion. An example is the “Passengers on a Bus” 
metaphor which is used to demonstrate how thoughts, memories and past experiences can 
cause you to detour from moving towards what you value. The individual is represented 
by the bus driver, and the internal thoughts, feelings and past experiences are the 
passengers who become increasingly vocal when you move towards your valued 
direction. When you detour or turn away from the valued direction, the voices quieten. 
Both pictorial representations of the metaphor can be presented to the client, or it can be 
role played in small groups. This multimodal approach to therapy allows the therapist to 
make modifications to account for individual differences in cognitive impairment.  
 Another area where ACT may be useful after a TBI is the process of accepting 
difficult thoughts and emotions. The thoughts experienced by the person with a severe 
TBI may not be irrational or be appropriate for challenging in the context of them having 
undergone a significant event which will have a lasting impact on the rest of their life 
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(deGuise et al., 2008). ACT shows the person how to sit with distressing thoughts and 
emotions but still engage in values based behaviour, this particular facet of ACT has been 
used successfully with chronic, unchangeable health conditions such as diabetes and 
fibromyalgia (Luciano et al., 2014; Makvand Hoseini, Rezaei, & Azadi, 2014b).  
 There are a number of similarities between ACT and other therapy modalities that 
have proved efficacious after TBI, providing additional evidence that ACT is likely to be 
appropriate for this population group. Ingredients of motivational interviewing, which has 
been successfully used with a TBI sample (Hsieh et al., 2012), include a focus on values 
guided behaviour are ACT-consistent (Bricker & Tollison, 2011). Similarly, other key 
therapy components including behavioural activation, building of awareness and 
experiential acceptance are common across a number of therapy modalities including 
ACT and have been shown to be an effective components for change (Arch, Wolitzky-
Taylor, et al., 2012; Bond & Bunce, 2000; Forman et al., 2012; Hesser, Westin, & 
Andersson, 2014; Wetherell et al., 2011).  
 
 Investigations of individual components of ACT further, suggest that it is consistent 
with the post TBI adjustment process. Post-TBI adjustment has been described as 
involving emotional acceptance of the impairments into the patient’s self-concept in 
addition to adaptations to behaviour and successful social reintegration (Antonak, Livneh, 
& Antonak, 1993). This adjustment seems to reflect components of psychological 
flexibility, specifically the acceptance and ‘self–as-context’ processes of the 
psychological flexibility model (Hayes et al., 2006). Self-as-context requires a person to 
distinguish themselves as separate from their thoughts or feelings which helps to create 
awareness and reduce the attachment to the conceptualised self. A person may have a 
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conceptualised self as being ‘the comedian’ in social situations, always making people 
laugh. After the injury, due to their cognitive impairments, they are no longer able to play 
this role resulting in avoidance of social situations with increased feelings of sadness and 
loss. Thus, impairments to self-concept commonly seen following TBI would require this 
element of psychological flexibility to increase awareness and further facilitate 
adjustment post injury as the individual comes to terms with their post injury self. These 
components of psychological flexibility may be the defining differences from cognitive 
flexibility and indicate why psychological interventions can be effective after a TBI.  
 Self-awareness may also be an important consideration in the relationship between 
cognitive and psychological flexibility. Impairments in awareness after a TBI are not 
consistent across all domains with lack of awareness being more evident in 
emotional/behavioural and cognitive domains (Fann et al., 2009). Impaired self-
awareness impacts on engagement in rehabilitation (Vanderploeg et al., 2008), improves 
over time after sustaining an injury (Hibbard, Gordon, Egelko, & Langer, 1987; 
Schrijnemaekers, Smeets, Ponds, van Heugten, & Rasquin, 2013; Sherer et al., 2003) and 
is related to severity of injury (Morton & Barker, 2010). Increased self-awareness after a 
TBI leads to more favourable rehabilitation outcomes (Walter, Palmieri, & Gunstad, 
2010), such as improved participation and social integration (Jennifer M Fleming et al., 
2006) despite often resulting in increased emotional distress (Chervinsky et al., 1998; 
McBrinn et al., 2008; Schrijnemaekers et al., 2013; Sherer et al., 2003). Improvement in 
behavioural domains in the presence of emotional distress is suggestive of psychological 
flexibility. Individuals are able to engage in meaningful behaviour such as participation 
in valued activities despite being aware of and distressed by their post TBI impairments. 
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As self-awareness increases, individuals are able to accept and incorporate their 
impairments into their new identity and eventually move on with their life.  
Although a relationship between psychological flexibility and self-awareness is 
theoretically probable, no specific research was identified that had directly investigated 
these associations. The practice of mindfulness, used to engage core processes in ACT, is 
proposed to facilitate self-awareness (Vago & Silbersweig, 2012) but this relationship has 
yet to be explored in a sample with TBI. There are several possibilities about how the 
relationship between self-awareness and psychological flexibility might manifest itself.  
The most likely relationship seems to be that lower self-awareness would be 
associated with lower psychological flexibility (as indirectly evidenced by the 
relationship between cognitive flexibility and self-awareness). Is it possible that some 
individuals could have low self-awareness and low cognitive flexibility but still be able to 
develop psychological flexibility? By way of example, an individual may have low 
awareness of their increased irritability and anger following TBI despite it being apparent 
to family and friends. This behaviour is associated with low cognitive flexibility, 
reflected in their difficulty with changing perspectives (or set) and coming up with 
alternative ways of addressing problems. However, the person may be open to observing 
their emotions and sitting with them more thoughtfully despite having impaired cognitive 
flexibility. There is potential to learn new ways to do this (perhaps through mindfulness 
training). Under these circumstances there is currently low self-awareness of emotional 
responding, low cognitive flexibility in being able to change perspectives or come up 
with alternatives to problems (which might elicit angry responses), but an openness to 
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internal experiences with the potential for these skills to improve further (psychological 
flexibility). 
 In summary, in a TBI population, it appears that impaired cognitive flexibility can lead 
to poor problem solving and the inability to shift to alternative solutions. Impaired 
cognitive flexibility is also associated with poor awareness of the deficits that occur after 
the brain injury. Poor psychological flexibility is evidenced by responding with the same 
emotional response (usually negative) to different situations. Improvements in self-
awareness results in better social and vocational outcomes but is often accompanied by 
increased psychological distress secondary to greater awareness of deficits. Despite 
overlaps in definition and research findings, it is unclear whether those who have 
impaired cognitive flexibility are able to develop psychological flexibility and whether 
this is mediated or linked to self-awareness of deficits after a TBI. It is possible that 
increased psychological flexibility (e.g., acceptance of thoughts and feelings) might 
mitigate the secondary negative effects of improved self-awareness. It remains for future 
research to test these potential relationships but the above theoretical and empirical 
considerations highlight the probable relationships between self-awareness, cognitive and 
psychological flexibility. 
Therapy modification to account for cognitive impairments 
 The use of acceptance-based therapies, specifically ACT, after an ABI has received 
two comprehensive reviews (Kangas & McDonald, 2011; Soo et al., 2011). As a result, 
recommendations have been made on how to best delivery ACT to account for the 
cognitive impairments displayed after a brain injury, though it should be noted one 
review was in the context of mild-moderate brain injury (Kangas & McDonald, 2011). A 
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number of these recommendations reflect practical suggestions that also apply to the 
modification of traditional CBT including provision of memory aids such as written 
notes, repeating and revising information and involving a family member (Hibbard et al., 
1987; Khan-Bourne & Brown, 2003; Klonoff, 2010; Ponsford, Sloan, & Snow, 2013; 
Whitehouse, 1994). Table 3 provides an outline of existing recommendations for therapy 
modifications for both cognitive therapy and CBT. A more comprehensive review of 
cognitive impairments commonly displayed after brain injury with corresponding 
strategies and therapy adaptations is provided by Ownsworth (2014). 
(insert Table 3 about here) 
 Therapy modifications that are more specific to ACT (see Table 3) include 
maintaining a therapy focus on the behavioural change processes (see Figure 1) such as 
identification of values and committed action (Soo et al., 2011). ACT excels at 
transforming the abstract into the concrete. There is an extensive library of metaphors 
available enabling the opportunity to select metaphors which are both tangible and 
personally meaningful for the individual. A number of metaphors have been captured in 
pictures or created into short videos by members of the ACT community, making them 
readily accessible for therapists. It is also recommended that therapists using ACT 
demonstrate flexibility by allowing the person with a TBI to develop their own meaning 
from the metaphor. 
  
Conclusion 
Psychological flexibility appears to be linked to health and wellbeing and is a goal of 
treatment for acceptance-based therapies such as ACT. This review has identified an 
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overlap between the constructs of cognitive and psychological flexibility at several 
levels; 1. There is a significant definitional and conceptual overlap; 2. There is also 
preliminary evidence of overlap in terms of associations with neurological functioning 
and the location of brain activity associated with tasks that demand cognitive and 
psychological flexibility; 3. Impairments in both constructs have demonstrated a complex 
relationship with psychopathology; 4. Extant measures have some overlap, particularly 
the self-report measures of cognitive and psychological flexibility but less so the 
neuropsychological measures and finally; 5. Variables that have been associated with 
important outcomes following TBI (e.g., self-awareness) have both theoretical and some 
empirical links to both constructs. 
 Both cognitive and psychological flexibility ideally lead to a change in behaviour 
(either a thought or an action) in response to environmental change. When a broader 
definition of cognitive flexibility is considered, it is more than simply the ability to 
switch between tasks. It incorporates additional cognitive processes including attention, 
memory, inhibition and other processes such as perception and previous knowledge 
which also  interact with environmental processes (Ionescu, 2012). This indicates an even 
closer alignment with the broader definition of psychological flexibility in that it 
encompasses context, both internal and external to the person, in which the change 
occurs. This suggests they may be similar constructs but currently being viewed from 
different psychological perspectives.  
 It is well established that people with a TBI often suffer from cognitive inflexibility as 
a result of damage to their executive processes but research also indicates that they 
respond positively to different forms of psychological therapy (Bombardier et al., 2009; 
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Hodgson, McDonald, Tate, & Gertler, 2005; Hsieh et al., 2012; Medd & Tate, 2000; 
Simpson et al., 2011). If increases in psychological flexibility are central to 
improvements in such therapy outcomes, this suggests that cognitive flexibility, as 
measured by task-based neuropsychological tests, may not be a prerequisite for 
psychological flexibility. Furthermore, performance on the task-based tests currently 
being used to operationalise cognitive flexibility may not be a good predictor of ability to 
successfully engage in therapy. This provides additional support for the concerns raised 
about the poor ecological validity of these types of measures  (Burgess et al., 2006).  
 Preliminary research into therapies, such as ACT which specifically promote 
psychological flexibility, have shown encouraging results in samples with cognitive 
impairments (Sylvester, 2011; Whiting, Simpson, Ciarrochi, et al., 2012). Also, 
acceptance-based therapies appear to be adaptable in order to account for the impairments 
evident after a severe TBI. Pragmatically, this would suggest that people with a TBI can 
“accept their negative emotions” and not “avoid them” (indicating psychological 
flexibility) even though they may have impairments in their cognitive flexibility. The 
influence of self-awareness may also need to be considered as it is associated with 
cognitive flexibility and, improved self-awareness appears to be an important factor for 
active engagement in therapy. This might suggest that increases in self-awareness may be 
associated with increased psychological flexibility or self-awareness plays a mediating 
role in the relationship. Further research into this relationship may also contribute to our 
understanding of how cognitive and psychological flexibility are related. 
 Further research into therapies which claim to improve psychological flexibility, such 
as ACT, need to be undertaken in TBI populations. It may also be beneficial to 
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understand how each component of the ACT hexaflex contributes to the development of 
psychological flexibility and how the processes interact. Investigations into whether 
approaches to compensate for impairments in cognitive inflexibility have the ability to 
promote “acceptance”, an important component of psychological flexibility after TBI, are 
warranted. Overall, there is a need for research into cognitive rehabilitation or treatment 
studies addressing impairments into cognitive flexibility and other executive functioning, 
as there is a paucity of research in this area. 
 Finally, undertaking further validation studies between both neuropsychological and 
self-report measures of cognitive flexibility and measures of psychological flexibility 
may assist in improving our understanding of how these two constructs are related and 
interact. What we might be seeing is that flexibility in psychology exists not on a 
continuum but as more of a network. Cognitive flexibility maybe impaired, as measured 
on neuropsychological tests as well as self-report measures, but the individual is still able 
to demonstrate psychological flexibility by adapting and responding appropriately in 
response to both internal and external experiences due to contextual influences. 
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Figure 1. Hexaflex: Model of psychological flexibility












The opening up and making room for distressing thoughts, emotions 
or experiences so that there is no longer an ongoing struggle 
Defusion The process of creating some separation from distressing thoughts, 
emotions or experiences and changing the function of the thought 
rather than the content 
Self-as-context Or ‘the observing self’, seeks to demonstrate that a component of us 
is always the same, regardless of what is changing with regard to our 
feelings or experiences. 
Contact with the 
present moment 
Involves being in the here and now, being more behaviourally 
flexible and consciously connecting with what is happening in that 
moment. 
Values Are unique to each individual and provide the framework for goal 
setting and engaging in committed action in line with these 
personally relevant principles. 
Committed action Involves either persisting or altering behaviour that is values based. 
 
  




Table 2. A summary of the constructs of cognitive and psychological flexibility 
 
a






(Strauss et al., 2006); 
e
(Martin & Rubin, 1995); 
f
(Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010); 
g
(Bond et al., 2011). 
  







Clinical populations Studied in brain damaged and other 
clinical populations 
Studied in both clinical, 
health and nonclinical 
populations 
Definition Restricted and broad definitions 
provided 







    Correlational studies 
    Limited neuroimaging  
Mental processes Shifting set, attention, goal 
identification, using feedback, 
monitoring, perception and stored 
knowledge 
Limited research but appears 
to involve, attention, 
working memory and 
executive functions 
Neural substrate 
(regions of the brain) 
Neural basis well defined 
   activation in prefrontal cortex 
   None in occipital regions 
Neural basis less clearly 
specified 
Some elements established 
Clinical implications for 
therapy 
Well established strong relationships      
with psychopathology 
Antecedent, maintaining factor and 
consequence of psychopathology 
Emerging strong relationships 
with psychopathology and 
chronic health conditions 
Association with 
psychopathology 
Schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, 
eating disorders, bipolar disorder 
Depression, eating disorders 
and anxiety  
How the construct is 
measured 
Objective  neuropsychological tasks 
Self-report measures 
Self-report measures 
Assessment approaches Wisconsin Cart Sort Test (WCST)
a
 






Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS)
e
 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI)
f
 
Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ-II)g 
and variations 
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Table 3. Suggested therapy modifications to account for cognitive impairments 
 
Strategy Reference 
General Strategies for CBT & ACT  
Shorten length of the sessions 3, 5, 8 
Using memory aids e.g. written notes, cue cards, recordings 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 
Simplification of tasks 1, 4, 8 
Increased frequency of sessions 5 
Summarising & reviewing content regularly 1, 2, 4, 8 
Focus on behavioural techniques 1,7 
Involve a family member in the therapy process 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 
Initial sessions focus on educating, normalising and validating 6, 7 
Training to enhance other skills e.g. social skills 7, 8 
Concrete examples as opposed to abstract 3, 4, 7, 8 
Modelling of assignments by therapist and patient 1 
Highly structured session content 2, 8 
Repetition and slowed presentation 2, 3, 7, 8 





  Using personally relevant and concrete metaphors 9 
  Engaging in experiential exercises including role playing 9 
  Defusion techniques that are concrete e.g. Physicalising the thought  9 
  Focus on behavioural activation components 7 
  Providing tangible ideas e.g. Card Sorting Task from the Survey of 
Life Principles 2.2 (Ciarrochi & Bailey, 2008) 
9 
  Promotion of values based, goal directed behaviour 9 
  Shorter mindfulness exercises  10 









 (Ponsford et al., 2013), 
4
 (Klonoff, 2010), 
5
(Khan-Bourne & Brown, 2003),
 6
(Kangas & McDonald, 2011), 
7





(Whiting, Simpson, McLeod, et al., 2012), 
10
(Bédard et al., 2014). 
